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WHAT THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT WAS AND WASN'T
(WITH NOTES ON MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. AND MALCOLM X)t
Cass R. Sunstein*
In this David C. Baum Memorial Lecture on Civil Liberties
and Civil Rights, Professor Sunstein begins by noting that par-
ticipants in the civil rights movement were often backward look-
ing and even conservative, invoking commitments from the na-
tion's past and arguing against reliance on the judiciary and the
Supreme Court. They stressed above all two time-honored lib-
eral principles: freedom from desperate conditions and opposi-
tion to caste. It is wrong to say (as many now do) that the move-
ment was founded on a principle of race neutrality, and also
wrong to say (as some now do) that the movement was opposed
to "categories" or "binary oppositions." Professor Sunstein then
raises important issues of character by exploring the works of
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X. He concludes by dis-
cussing the risks of dehumanization and brutality in movements
committed to significant social change.
We're all black to the white man, but we're a thousand and one
different colors. Turn around, look at each -other!
-Malcolm X 1
Less and less do we transform private troubles into public issues.
There is no willingness to take risks, no setting of dangerous
goals. The time has come for a reassertion of the personal.
-Tom Hayden, 19622
t This article was originally presented on April 18, 1994, as the second 1993-94
lecture of the David C. Baum Memorial Lectures on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights at the
University of Illinois College of Law.
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chi-
cago. A.B. 1975, J.D. 1978, Harvard University. The author would like to thank Ray Austin and
Thomas Brown for their research assistance, and the faculty and students of the College of Law
-for their hospitality and for their extremely valuable reactions.
1. MALCOLM X. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 201 (1964) [hereinafter
AUTOBIOGRAPHY].
2. JAMES MILLER. DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS 101 (1987).
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On a theoretical level, you can say that we believed in wanting to
make history and achieve civil rights. But there was something
else. . . . The whole emotion of defining not only yourself, but
also your life by risking your life, and testing whether you're
willing to die for your beliefs, was the powerful motive, I believe.
-Tom Hayden, 1987'
I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious
racists, with its governor having his lips dripping with the words
of interposition and nullification, that one day, right there in Al-
abama, little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands
with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers.
-Martin Luther King, Jr.4
What claims were made by those involved in the civil rights move-
ment of the 1960s? What sorts of changes were sought for society and
particularly for law? And what are the implications of the civil rights
movement for the issues that face us today? In this essay, I will ex-
plore a few aspects of this very large and controversial topic.
This is a somewhat unusual subject for a lawyer; but the topic is
far from irrelevant to law. Some people think that the American con-
stitutional tradition has been punctuated by a range of constitutional
moments. 5 Whether or not this is so, the civil rights movement of the
1960s unquestionably helped transform our understandings of consti-
tutional principles, including most prominently rights to free speech
and equal protection of the laws. The political and moral claims of the
movement helped spur legislation' that continues to raise foundational
issues about our constitutional order.7
Few people think that the civil rights movement actually
amended the constitution,8 and very possibly the best view is that so-
cial movements of this kind have no bearing on constitutional mean-
ing. But if we are simply describing our practices, it seems clear that
disputes about the appropriate characterization-and evaluation-of
the movement play a continuing role in public debate and even consti-
tutional law. It is therefore plausible to say that a discussion of the
civil rights movement is not only of interest in its own right. It also
connects to our understanding of our constitutional heritage.
3. Id. at 59.
4. MARTIN LUTHER KING. A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING. JR. 219 (James M. Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
5. See I BRUCE A. ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
6. 1 refer especially to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, and
to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1988)). See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).
8. Though Ackerman does make a suggestion of this sort. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 196.
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There are of course great hazards in describing so large and di-
verse a movement, with so many different defining strands, in a short
compass. What I will say is shamelessly selective and impressionistic.
As my principal texts, I use the writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
the writings of Malcolm X, and the founding document of the Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Port Huron Statement.9
My goal is mostly descriptive, though not surprisingly my own evalua-
tions will appear from time to time.
I. WHAT THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT WAS FOR
A. Deviation Between Practice and Ideal
Perhaps surprisingly, a careful reading of the basic documents of
the civil rights movement shows that much of the movement was con-
servative and backward looking. At least in its earliest stages, and to a
significant extent thereafter, its defining aspirations came from
America's own stated ideals. Often participants in the movement at-
tempted to identify those ideals and to insist that the nation should
live up to them. In this way the movement had an important Burkean
caste, looking to the past to help define the appropriate content of the
future.
For the most part, participants in the movement made little effort
to find basic commitments in places external to the American culture,
or to challenge the American culture itself. They described racial ine-
quality as an anomalous institution entirely inconsistent with the basic
thrust of American ideals and practices. (This came to be one of the
most visible divisions between Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm
X, with the latter repudiating American ideals as fundamentally in-
fected with racism. 10) In this way, the civil rights movement borrowed
a conventional lawyer's strategy: to invoke a widely shared and time-
honored ideal and to show that the practice at issue did not comport
with that ideal.
For example, the Port Huron Statement insisted that "[t]he dec-
laration 'all men are created equal . . .' rang hollow before the facts of
Negro life in the South and the big cities of the North."" The student
authors emphasized "the hypocrisy of American ideals."' 2 Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., challenged the same thing in similar words, saying "All
we say to America is-Be true to what you said on paper."' 3
9. See MILLER, supra note 2, app. Miller's book is an illuminating discussion of the SDS.
10. See AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 273-81.
11. MILLER, supra note 1, at 330.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 282.
No. I1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
King's speeches frequently looked backward for the nation's core
commitments. Thus he wrote in the "I have a dream" speech that his
"is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream that one day this
nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed-we hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal." '14 Thus
he suggested that "[o]ne day the South will know that when these
disinherited children of God sat down at lunch counters, they were in
reality standing up for what is best in the American dream."15 Thus
King self-consciously invoked the Declaration of Independence, em-
phasizing that "[n]ever has a sociopolitical document proclaimed
more profoundly and eloquently the sacredness of human
personality." 16
I have given simply a few illustrations of a pervasive claim in the
civil rights movement. As I have suggested, the basic objection-that
racial inequality was inconsistent with American ideals-was a defin-
ing feature of the movement. As the movement became more radical,
some of its members urged that racial inequality was an ineradicable
part of American practice, rather than an isolated anomaly. Black na-
tionalism was a response to this claim. 7
B. Freedom from Desperate Conditions
Participants in the civil rights movement stressed two substantive
strands of liberal thought. Both of these are important aspects of lib-
eralism. The first involves freedom from desperate conditions; the sec-
ond involves opposition to caste.
American political thought has never been egalitarian. It has re-
jected equality of income and wealth as both unnecessary and
counterproductive."8 But the belief in freedom from desperate condi-
tions-not an egalitarian ideal-has long roots in the American politi-
cal tradition. This form of freedom was supported by both James
Madison 9 and Thomas Jefferson.20 It received one of its most cele-
brated endorsements in the. 1944 State of the Union address by Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt urged a "second Bill of Rights,"
including "the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and
clothing and recreation," "the right of every family to a decent
home," "the right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to
14. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 4, at 219.
15. THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. JR. II (Alex Ayres ed., 1993).
16. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 4, at 119.
17. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758.
18. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
19. JAMES MADISON, 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197-98 (Robert A. Rutland et al.,
eds., 1983).
20. THOMAS JEFFERSON. 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 681-83 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1953).
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achieve and enjoy good health," and "the right to a good
education."21
In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the commitment to
freedom from desperate conditions was a creation of the civil rights
movement or of the 1960s. But ideas of this sort did reemerge, and in
dramatic fashion. Such ideas were spurred by Michael Harrington's
extremely influential book, The Other America.2 Answering John
Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society,23 Harrington contended
that in fact many Americans lived in desperate conditions. Though
this "other America" was often invisible, it included, according to
Harrington, millions of poor people. The book helped contribute to the
''war on poverty" inaugurated by President Johnson.
An emphasis on desperate conditions was a crucial part of the
civil rights movement, and it helped define its basic goals. Thus the
Port Huron Statement suggested, "A program against poverty must
be just as sweeping as the nature of the problem itself. It must not be
just palliative, but directed to the abolition of the structural circum-
stances of poverty. . . . [E]xisting institutions should be expanded so
the welfare state cares for everyone's welfare according to need.""
King wrote in the same vein that "[t]he time has come for us to civi-
lize ourselves by the total, direct and immediate abolition of pov-
erty." '25 A particular concern was joblessness, and hence King said,
"Let us do one simple, direct thing-let us end unemployment totally
and immediately."2
More concretely, King proposed a bill of rights for the disadvan-
taged, including equal opportunity and a right to training. His state-
ment of overall objectives included "[e]conomic security, decent sani-
tary housing, and quality education for every American. ' 7 King
urged that "[a] Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged could mark the
rise of a new era, in which the full resources of the society would be
used to attack the tenacious poverty which so paradoxically exists in
the midst of plenty."'2 8
Most dramatically, King proposed toward the end of his life a
"poor people's march," designed to dramatize the plight of the disad-
vantaged. He wrote,
21. Franklin Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944),
reprinted in 13 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32, 41 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1950).
22. MICHAEL HARRINGTON. THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).
23. JOHN K. GALBRAITH. THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1960).
24. MILLER, supra note 2, at 365.
25. THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 15, at 181.
26. Id. at 224.
27. Id. at 180.
28. Id. at 22.
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There are millions of poor people in this country who have very
little, or even nothing, to lose. If they can be helped to take ac-
tion together, they will do so with a freedom and a power that
will be a new and unsettling force in our complacent national
life. Beginning in the new year, we will be recruiting three thou-
sand of the poorest citizens from ten different urban and rural
areas to initiate and lead a sustained, massive, direct-action
movement in Washington. . . . [W]e will move on to Washing-
ton, determined to stay there until the legislative and executive
branches of the government take serious and adequate action on
jobs and incomes. . . . The many people who will come and join
this three thousand, from all groups in the country's life, will
play a supportive role, deciding to be poor for a time along with
the dispossessed who are asking for their right to jobs or in-
come-jobs, income, the demolition of slums, and the rebuilding
by the people who live there of new communities in their place;
in fact, a new economic deal for the poor. 9
This endorsement of "a new economic deal" was the practical effort
that followed the commitment to freedom from desperate conditions.
C. Opposition to Caste
An important feature of the civil rights movement might be de-
scribed as an anticaste principle.30 This principle finds its origins in
the original constitutional rejection of the monarchical legacy3' and
the explicit constitutional ban on titles of nobility.32 The principle was
fueled by the Civil War Amendments and the New Deal. The objec-
tion to caste entails an effort to eliminate, in places large and small,
the caste system rooted in race. We might say that we have a caste
system when a highly visible but morally irrelevant characteristic is
associated with second-class citizenship, in the form of systematic dis-
parities in well-being along the most important dimensions of social
welfare. Consider in this regard the Port Huron Statement, which be-
gins its discussion of discrimination with the claim, "Our America is
still white." 33 The authors supported this claim with reference to
sharp disparities between blacks and whites with respect to literacy,
salary, work, unemployment, housing, education, and voting.34
29. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 4, at 651.
30. For related discussion, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 291-318
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994) [hereinafter
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle].
31. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11-109
(1992).
32. US. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
33. MILLER, supra note 2, at 352.
34. Id.
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Second-class citizenship was a continuing theme in the writing
and speeches of Malcolm X. Indeed, Malcolm X stressed this idea in
urging self-help remedies, which he thought necessary to overcome de-
pendent status:
The American black man should be focussing his every ef-
fort toward building his own businesses, and decent homes for
himself. As other ethnic groups have done, let the black people,
wherever possible, however possible, patronize their own kind,
hire their own kind, and start in those ways to build up the black
race's ability to do for itself. That's the only way the American
black man is ever going to get respect. One thing the white man
never can give the black man is self-respect!"6
In fact, an important feature of any caste system involves corro-
sive effects on the self-respect of its victims; and self-respect was a key
issue in the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The interest in racial
integration-central, of course, to King-had a great deal to do with
such effects. For King, racial segregation was unacceptable because it
was a daily reminder of a perceived inferiority. "Any law that de-
grades human personality is unjust. All segregation laws are unjust
because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It
gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a
false sense of inferiority."3 " Part of the problem with segregation was
that it denied self-respect: "Segregation scars the soul of both the seg-
regator and the segregated. The segregator looks upon the segregated
as a thing to be used, not a person to be respected. ' 37
Ironically, interest in black nationalism stemmed from similar
concerns, with a perception that improved caste status could not be
achieved in America.38 Malcolm X favored racial separation on these
grounds:
[A]s long as our people here in America are dependent upon the
white man, we will always be begging him for jobs, food, cloth-
ing, and housing. . . . The Negro here in America has been
treated like a child. A child stays with the mother until the time
of birth! When the time of birth arrives, the child must be sepa-
rated, or it will destroy its mother and itself .... The child cries
for and needs its own world!39
Much of Malcolm X's attack on the movement for integration con-
sisted of a claim that blacks did not need to be with whites in order to
succeed. Malcolm X thus wrote:
35. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 275.
36. THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. JR., supra note 15, at 198.
37. Id.
38. See Peller, supra note 17, at 770-80.
39. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note I, at 246.
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Respect as human beings! That's what America's black masses
want. That's the true problem. The black masses want not to be
shrunk from as though they are plague-ridden. They want not to
be walled up in slums, in the ghettoes, like animals. They want
to live in an open, free society where they can walk with their
heads up, like men and women!40
On this count at least, King spoke similarly: "The Negro must
boldly throw off the manacles of self-abnegation and say to himself
and the world: 'I am somebody. I am a person. I am a man with
dignity and honor. I have a rich and noble history, however painful
and exploited that history has been.'"41
D. Emphasis on Citizenship and Nonjudicial Means for Seeking
Change
The 1960s were a time of extraordinary judge-led developments,
with the Warren Court at its ascendancy. But it should be recalled
that the civil rights movement was hardly focussed on courts, and in
fact the notion of "participatory democracy" enjoyed a large-scale re-
vival in the 1960s.' 2 The revival has had continuing effects on Ameri-
can law. The Port Huron Statement is characterized above all by this
theme: "[W]e seek the establishment of a democracy of individual
participation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share
in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his
life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and
provide the media for common participation. ' 13 Thus the student au-
thors lamented that "almost no students value activity as citizens.""
They urged that "politics has the function of bringing people out of
isolation and into community."' 5 They sought a political life based on
the principle "that decision-making of basic social consequence be
carried on by public groupings" and "that politics be seen positively,
as the art of collectively creating an acceptable pattern of social
relations."' 6
Ideas of this sort played a substantial role in the civil rights
movement. In its early stages the movement had been highly court-
centered, above all in Thurgood Marshall's attack on segregation
under the name of the Constitution.' 7 But the Port Huron Statement
40. Id. at 272.
41. THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. JR., supra note 15, at 199-200.
42. MILLER, supra note 2, is a detailed discussion.
43. Id. at 333.
44. Id. at 334.
45. Id. at 333.
46. Id.
47. See MARK V. TUSHNET. MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT. 1936-61 (1994).
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urged a different direction, saying that "the historic Supreme Court
decision of 1954, theoretically desegregating Southern schools, was
more a proclamation than a harbinger of social change-and is re-
flected as such in the fraction of Southern school districts which have
desegregated, with Federal officials doing little to spur the process."48
Hence the student movement relied little on courts.
Rejecting the judge-focussed approach, Martin Luther King
sharply criticized reliance on courts alone, suggesting that judicial fo-
rums bred passivity: "When legal contests were the sole form of activ-
ity, the ordinary Negro was involved as a passive spectator. His inter-
ests were stirred, but his energies were unemployed. 49 In a similar
vein, King wrote on the inadequacy of decrees standing by themselves:
"The law tends to declare rights-it does not deliver them. A catalyst
is needed to breathe life experience into a judicial decision by the per-
sistent exercise of the rights until they become usual and ordinary in
human conduct." 50
King also placed a premium on citizenship. To be sure, he was
not a participatory democrat of the SDS variety; he saw participation
as instrumental to other social goals. But he nonetheless urged wide-
spread involvement in politics:
I do have a graduation thought to pass along to you. Whatever
career you may choose for yourself-doctor, lawyer, teacher-let
me propose an avocation to be pursued along with it. Become a
dedicated fighter for civil rights. Make it a central part of your
life. . . .You will make a greater person of yourself, a greater
nation of your country, and a finer world to live in. 51
Hence King emphasized the political process above all: "The chief
weapon in our fight for civil rights is the vote. I can foresee the Negro
vote becoming the decisive vote in national elections. 52 One of King's
most powerful early speeches is titled: "Give Us the Ballot-We Will
Transform the South." The speech is focussed on the need to supple-
ment the judicial branch with democratic forums:
So far, only the judicial branch of the government has evinced
this quality of leadership. If the executive and legislative
branches of the government were as concerned about the protec-
tion of our citizenship rights as the federal courts have been,
then the transition from a segregated to an integrated society
would be infinitely smoother.54
48. MILLER, Supra note 2, at 353.
49. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 4, at 566.
50. Id. at 165.
51. Id. at 22.
52. THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 15, at 230.
53. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 4, at 197.
54. id. at 198.
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On this count, King and Malcolm X were closely allied. Malcolm
X similarly expressed support for nonjudicial arenas:
The polls are one place where every black man could fight the
black man's cause with dignity, and with the power and the tools
that the white man understands and respects, and fears, and
cooperates with ...
The cornerstones of this country's operation are economic
and political strength and power. The black man doesn't have the
economic strength-and it will take time for him to build it. But
right now the American black man has the political strength and
power to change his destiny overnight. 55
Similarly, Malcolm X said, "I might point out that I am 100 percent
for any effort put forth by Black people in this country to have access
to the ballot." He urged-in the now famous phrase-that people use
"whatever means is necessary to secure those rights."' 6
II. WHAT THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT WAS NOT
In this section I deal briefly with two relatively recent "readings"
of the civil rights movement. The first characterizes the movement as
opposed to all racial classifications. On this view, a target of the civil
rights movement, if its principles are rightly characterized, is affirma-
tive action, and Martin Luther King is enlisted as an opponent of
race-conscious approaches. The second "reading," popular in the
academy in general if not in law schools, suggests that the movement
should be taken as a challenge to "categorical thinking" or "binary
oppositions." I suggest why both readings seem to me unfortunate.
A. Colorblindness
King's "I have a dream" speech referred to the possibility that
"my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will
not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their
character." 7 These words have been invoked in prominent attacks on
affirmative action policies.5B But participants in the civil rights move-
ment were emphatically not committed to a norm of colorblindness.
Though King sometimes spoke in these terms, he was speaking not
abstractly but in a particular context at a particular historical mo-
ment, and he meant to make a particular historical point, one very
55. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note I, at 313-15.
56. MALCOLM X. FEBRUARY 1965: THE FINAL SPEECHES 24 (Steve Clark ed., 1992).
57. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 4, at 219.
58. See, e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of
Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 1000-05 (1984).
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much connected to issues of lower caste status. He was certainly not
speaking to the issue of affirmative action. In fact King was urging a
form of social transformation of which affirmative action is, at least
plausibly, a part."9 The norm that he urged was not incompatible with
affirmative action schemes and indeed could well have been used to
support them.
In fact, King never spoke directly to the issue of affirmative ac-
tion, although some of his statements suggested that he would hardly
have rejected it on principle. Thus King wrote:
It is impossible to create a formula for the future which does not
take into account that our society has been doing something spe-
cial against the Negro for hundreds of years. How then can he
be absorbed into the mainstream of American life if we do not
do something special for him now, in order to balance the equa-
tion and equip him to compete on an equal basis? 60
I do not suggest that King is properly characterized as a proponent of
affirmative action policies, or that the 1960s civil rights movement is
necessarily conceived as favoring such policies. But it is at best histor-
ical to suggest that King opposed such policies, or that his statements
suggest a principle of colorblindness whatever its purposes and effects.
B. Opposition to Categorical Thinking
Many people in the academy now challenge "categories," or
"categorical thinking," or "binary oppositions," 1 and it seems plausi-
ble to suggest that these challenges are perceived, in many quarters,
as an outgrowth of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Generally,
it is said that "categorical thinking" is a problem and that it is impor-
tant to move beyond "binary oppositions" of various sorts. More par-
ticularly, it is said that the opposition between black and white treats
as opposed two categories that are interdependent and mutually over-
lapping. The same, it is said, is true for gender. The division of human
beings into "two kinds," male and female, is said to be a binary oppo-
sition that is oppressive because it is too simple.62 The general and the
59. A similar point is made in STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH:
AND IT'S A GOOD THING. Too 60-79 (1994).
60. THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 15, at 68.
61. See, e.g, ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN. THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988); Katharine
T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Dennis Peterson,
Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254 (1992); Susan Sage Heinzelman, Hard
Cases, Easy Cases and Weird Cases: Canon Formation in Law and Literature, MOSAIC, Spring
1988, at 59, 63. MARTHA MINOW. MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990), appears influenced by
work of this sort.
62. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(1989).
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particular claims are united through the view that insisting on sharp
categorical differences is perniciously hierarchical."
In the context of both race and sex, the challenge to sharp cate-
gorical differences is based on something true and important. People
are not simply black or white; as a matter of genetic fact, they have
complex and mixed racial and ethnic ancestries. Consider the fact
that the plaintiff in Plessy v. Ferguson"-Plessy himself-was only
one-sixteenth black. There is a separate point. Race becomes an im-
portant social category only because of what society deems important.
For young children, racial differences do not "code"--do not have the
same meaning-in the way they do for adults in America. At least
some of the same points might be made for gender, though the issue
here is more contentious. Certainly no one could deny that there are
men and women, or that there are important differences between men
and women, many of them biological. But gender makes the social
difference that it does in part because of social and legal practices.65
But we may grant all this without accepting the view that binary
oppositions or categories are themselves problematic. In fact thought
itself proceeds through categories. We cannot make distinc-
tions-between justice and injustice, equality and inequality-without
categories or binary oppositions. We cannot distinguish between cate-
gorical thinking and its opposite (whatever that may be) without ref-
erence to categories. The problem with the challenge to categories and
binary oppositions is that the challenge loses sight of the moral and
political foundations of the attack on racial inequality. In fact it loses
sight of the civil rights movement's point. To challenge categorical
thinking is to abandon the moral foundations of the movement, which
was not an attack on categories as such, but on particular categories
that were pernicious for particular reasons. There is no reason to sup-
pose that categories are themselves the problem, or that we could or
should proceed without them. Thought itself depends on categories.
Indeed, a challenge to categorical thinking cannot really get off the
ground.
Ideas of the sort I am challenging have not been irrelevant to
law. Consider, for example, Roberto Unger's attack on "contexts" and
his advocacy of "context-smashing," an attack that assumes that fixed
contexts are themselves the problem.66 It seems plausible to think that
63. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 61.
64. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
65. Some adventurous people have challenged the division of human beings into "two
kinds." See BUTLER, supra note 62; THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER
FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD (1990).
66. See ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN
THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (PART I OF POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL
THEORY) (1987); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 109-11
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the influence of Unger's work is connected to its apparent connection
with the radical movements of the 1960s. But I think that the idea of
"context-smashing" as such makes little sense. Some contexts are of
course unjust, but this is not because of their status as contexts. It is
because there is something substantively wrong with them. The civil
rights movement was not challenging contexts, or fixity, as general
independent evils. It was taking racial inequality as a particular evil.
C. Implications for Law?
It is far from clear that the civil rights movement should be
taken to have implications for constitutional law. Perhaps social move-
ments of this kind bear on politics but not on law. This is certainly a
reasonable view. On the other hand, the civil rights movement, and
Martin Luther King in particular, have been prominently used in con-
stitutional argument. As we have seen, King's "I have a dream"
speech has been used to give moral weight to the constitutional attack
on affirmative action.67 I think that most generally, the movement
suggests a particular understanding of the issue of racial equality. It
grows directly out of the attack on racial caste. I offer a few words on
that understanding here. My goal is to offer a generalization, or a
reading, of what participants in the civil rights movement of the 1960s
were attacking.
The motivating idea behind an anticaste principle is that differ-
ences that are both highly visible and irrelevant from the moral point
of view ought not without good reason be turned, by social and legal
structures, into systematic social disadvantages. A systematic disad-
vantage is one that operates along standard and predictable lines in
many important spheres of life, and that applies in realms that relate
to basic participation as a citizen in a democracy. There is no al-
gorithm by which to identify those realms. As a provisional working
list, we might include education, freedom from private and public vio-
lence, income and wealth, employment, political representation, lon-
gevity, health, and political influence. (Recall the analogous list in the
Port Huron Statement.) The anticaste principle suggests that with re-
spect to basic human capabilities and functionings,6 a one group, de-
fined in terms of a morally irrelevant characteristic, ought not to be
systematically below another.
(1986). For more detailed criticism along the lines suggested here, see Cass R. Sunstein, Routine
and Revolution, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 869 (1987).
67. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 58, at 1000-05.
68. See AMARTYA SEN. INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristote-
lian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990).
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In the areas of race discrimination, a large part of the problem is
this sort of systemic disadvantage. A social or biological difference has
the effect of systematically subordinating members of the relevant
group-not because of "nature," but because of social and legal prac-
tices. It does so in multiple spheres and along multiple indices of so-
cial welfare: poverty, education, political power, employment, suscep-
tibility to violence and crime, and so forth. By pointing to these
variables, it should be clear that I am not stressing economic variables
alone, though these are indeed important. I am instead suggesting ref-
erence to a broad and eclectic set of social indicators.
Consider in this regard-and also by way of comparison to the
similar effort in the Port Huron Statement-the Human Development
Index in the United Nations Development Program's 1993 Human
Development Report.6 9 The index, based on longevity, educational at-
tainment, and per capita income, is itself somewhat crude.7 0 But it is
highly revealing that the United States as a whole ranks sixth; that
white Americans by themselves would rank first; and that blacks by
themselves would rank thirty-first (next to Trinidad and Tobago).7 1
As Martin Luther King and Malcolm X both emphasized, sys-
tematic differences of this kind help produce frequent injuries to self-
respect-the time-honored constitutional notion of "stigma." A par-
ticular concern is that self-respect and its social bases ought not be
distributed along the lines of race. 2 When someone is a member of a
group that is systematically below others, and when the group charac-
teristic is highly visible, insults to self-respect are likely to occur
nearly every day. An important aspect of a system of caste is that
social practices produce a range of obstacles to the development of
self-respect, largely because of the presence of the highly visible but
morally irrelevant characteristic that gives rise to caste-like status.
Of course the law cannot provide self-respect, at least not in any
simple or direct way. But group membership tends to fuel a cycle of
discrimination, 3 in which, for example, employers rely on statistical
discrimination; group members adjust their aspirations to this reli-
ance; statistical discrimination becomes all the more rational; and so
on. That is an aspect of the caste system to which the legal system is
attempting to respond. It can operate largely because the high visibil-
ity of the group-based characteristic. If the characteristic were not
69. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, at 9-
20.
70. Id. at 10-18; see Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 HARV L REV 1303,
1322 n.72 (1994).
71. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, supra note 69, at 11, 18 & figs. 1.12-1.13.
72. Self-respect is emphasized in JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440-46 (1971), and
JOHN RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
73. For more detail, see Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, supra note 30.
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visible, the same pattern could not occur.7' And because the stigma-
tizing characteristic is highly visible, it will probably trigger reactions
from others in a wide variety of spheres, even in the interstices of
everyday life." Highly visible characteristics are especially likely to
be a basis for statistical discrimination and to fuel prejudice from
third parties. Consider stereotypes about the physical characteristics
of members of religious minorities, and compare this description of
attitudes in prerevolutionary America:
So distinctive and so separated was the aristocracy from ordinary
folk that many still thought the two groups represented two or-
ders of being. . . . Ordinary people were thought to be different
physically, and because of varying diets and living conditions, no
doubt in many cases they were different. People often assumed
that a handsome child, though apparently a commoner, had to be
some gentleman's bastard offspring. 76
In the area of race, daily denials of basic respect, usually based
on prejudice of some sort, are a large part of what it means to have a
caste system. With blacks, for example, dark skin color is associated
with a range of stereotypes that can have harmful effects during en-
counters with shopkeepers, employers, police officers, businesses, co-
workers, and much more. These encounters rank among the injuries
that the civil rights movement of the 1960s was attempting to elimi-
nate. I suggest that an anticaste principle is a reasonable "reading" of
its animating spirit.
It is important as well to note that any such principle is most
plausibly used by legislative and executive bodies, and that the focus
of the civil rights movement was on those bodies as well. Courts
should play a secondary role. They lack the power of initiative, the
fact-finding capacity, and the democratic legitimacy to bring about
systematic social change on their own.77 On this count participants in
the 1960s movement were very much on the right track. Their sub-
stantive goals were well-connected with this institutional choice, and
with their lack of emphasis on the judiciary as the foundation for so-
cial reform.
III. DEHUMANIZATION
I must now venture into somewhat more difficult and speculative
territory. It has to do with issues of character, and with the way that
74. Compare the problems of discrimination against homosexuals, a problem that raises dif-
ferent issues because homosexuality is not readily visible.
75. See Jane Mansbridge, Presentation at the Conference on Equal Protection and Its Crit-
ics at Brown University (Mar. 11, 1994).
76. WOOD. supra note 31, at 27.
77. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 6.
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we characterize and interact with people with whom we disagree, or
even people that we consider fundamentally different, or oppressors.
Begin with the opening quotation from Tom Hayden, which
reveals a part of the picture. Hayden writes that it is time to "reassert
the personal." Often it is said, and revealingly so, that the "personal is
the political. ' 78 This slogan means that personal issues, especially in
the area of sex equality, can be a product of political issues. Individ-
ual insults and injuries may connect with the distribution of political
power; individual insults and injuries may cause the harm they do
only because of the distribution of political power (consider the issue
of sexual harassment). But the converse is also and equally true; the
political may be the personal, in the sense that one's claims about
politics are often a product of one's personal issues as well. We need
not speculate about psychological forces in order to recognize this
point. The second quotation from Hayden, writing in 1988, makes
things very clear. On Hayden's retrospective view, personal desires of
a certain kind ("defining not only yourself, but also your life by risk-
ing your life") were dominant, and civil rights claims were in a sense
quite secondary. To put things a bit crudely, an important aspect of
the 1960s movement, especially among white student activists, con-
sisted of the playing out of personal issues in political guise. (This
does not of course disparage the political claims, which stand or fall
independently of their origins."9 )
There is a deeper point. In many radical movements, those who
seek social change sometimes portray themselves as more than
human, while they portray their enemies as less than human, or as
fundamentally other than human. Or they define both themselves and
their opponents just in terms of what separates them, so that there are
no other common links. Often, of course, this is a strategy of those
seeking to promote or maintain racial inequality; consider the rhetoric
of the Nazi Party, or of the Ku Klux Klan. But the same strategy is
often used by people who are seeking to overcome discrimination and
oppression."0 Hence there was a tendency in the 1960s civil rights
movement to dehumanize certain groups of people-to refuse to see
them as human beings, or as individuals with narratives, sufferings,
and life histories of their own.
78. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 314 (7th
printing 1992) (citing ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 16-18
(1989)).
79. For a related discussion, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Perception and Revolution: The
Princess Casamassima and the Political Imagination, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 195 (1990).
80. Of course there is a huge difference between dehumanization by oppressors and dehu-
manization by oppressed people. The first involves an unjust goal, the second (by hypothesis) does
not. But along the dimension I am discussing, the two phenomena are the same.
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We can see an example in Malcolm X's frequent description of
his oppressors as the "white man"-as if there were only one. Recall
the quotation at the beginning of this essay: "We're all black to the
white man." In fact Malcolm X used singular and plural forms
throughout his writing and speaking for rhetorical effect. Compare his
statement also quoted at the beginning of this essay: "[W]e're a thou-
sand and one different colors. Turn around, look at each other!" This
"looking" at particularity works, ironically, to establish common
ground. We can see something similar in Malcolm X's reaction to the
assassination of President Kennedy, to the effect that the "chickens
[have] com[e] home to roost.""1 The oddity of the reaction comes
from the fact that Kennedy's own personal history-his own life, his
family, his own role in promoting or undermining racial equal-
ity-was treated as quite beside the point.
Martin Luther King insistently avoided this form of dehumaniza-
tion. Instead he attempted at all times to combat it. In doing so he
raised two different points: the effects of this distinctive form of ha-
tred on those who hate, and the erasure of particularity and individu-
ality that is brought about by group-based hatred. Thus King wrote,
I have also decided to stick to love. . . . I'm not talking about
emotional bosh when I talk about love, I'm talking about a
strong, demanding love. And I have seen too much hate. I've
seen too much hate on the faces of sheriffs in the South. I've seen
hate on the faces of too many Klansman and too many White
Citizens Councilors in the South to want to hate myself, because
every time I see it, I know that it does something to their faces
and their personalities and I say to myself that hate is too great
a burden to bear. I have decided to love.8 2
Thus King wrote, "Hate is just as injurious to the person who hates.
Like an unchecked cancer, hate corrodes the personality and eats
away its vital unity."8 "
But most of King's response was connected with the need for par-
ticularity-with the need for humility, and for seeing each person as
an individual. In his view, this understanding was interestingly con-
nected with a commitment to universality. Rejecting sharp polarities
between good people and bad people, he said, "[T]here is some good
in the worst of us and some evil in the best of us. When we discover
this, we are less prone to hate our enemies." Thus he wrote, "The one
thing about bitterness is its blindness. Bitterness has not the capacity
81. See AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note I, at 301.
82. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 4, at 250.
83. Id. at 102. To this Malcolm X responded: "I do not agree with Martin Luther King that
one should love a racialist whether he is lynching you or whatever he is doing. I believe in fighting
a racialist physically." MALCOLM X, supra note 56, at 66-67.
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to make the distinction between some and all."'84 And the Port Huron
Statement reflected a similar view: "In social change or interchange,
we find violence to be abhorrent because it requires generally the
transformation of the target, be it a human being or a community of
people, into a depersonalized object of hate."85 The key term here is
"depersonalized object," something that is also accomplished through
the rhetorical ploy of using a singular to describe a group ("the white
man," "the Jew," "the liberal," and so forth).
In his famous statement after his trip to Mecca, Malcolm X
spoke in terms that assert both particularity and universality, in a way
that connected with some of King's own writing. Thus Malcolm X
said:
During the past eleven days here in the Muslim world, I have
eaten from the same plate, drunk from the same glass, and slept
in the same bed (or on the same rug) with fellow Muslims ...
whose eyes were the bluest of blue, whose hair was the blondest
of blond, and whose skin was the whitest of white. And in the
words and in the actions and in the deeds of the "white" Mus-
lims, I felt the same sincerity that I felt among the black African
Muslims of Nigeria, Sudan, and Ghana.
We were all truly the same .... 8'
On this score it will be useful to close with the final discussion in
a very popular book on the 1960s, Destructive Generation.87 The au-
thors are Peter Collier and David Horowitz, former editors of a left-
wing magazine, Ramparts, turned Reagan Republicans. The book
ends with an anecdote. The authors sought out Susan Sontag, who
had recently delivered an influential speech whose theme is captured
in its title: "Communism Is Fascism with a Human Face." Collier
and Horowitz, staunch anti-Communists, praised Sontag for that
speech, but "[w]arming to the occasion," pressed her for having re-
published without critical comment a 1969 essay about Communist
North Vietnam, in which Sontag appeared to praise communism. Col-
lier and Horowitz asked Sontag why she had not offered "further
challenges to the adversary culture's conventional wisdom about
America and democracy." (Note the terms "adversary culture" and
"conventional wisdom.") Collier and Horowitz added that Europe had
produced Hitler, and that it was America that had rescued Europe
"from the barbarisms of the East."
84. THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 15, at 26.
85. MILLER, supra note 2, at 333.
86. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 340.
87. PETER COLLIER & DAVID HOROWITZ. DESTRUCTIVE GENERATION: SECOND THOUGHTS
ABOUT THE SIXTIES 337-38 (1989).
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Sontag responded, "I'm not really interested in having this dis-
cussion. You're just projecting your own Manichaean politics onto the
world. I don't want to enter your world, where you push everything to
extremes." The book ends with a suggestion that Sontag "was
right-we did push things to extremes." But according to the authors,
her "judgment on us was also a judgment on her and others who un-
derstood the political stakes but didn't push things far enough."
What may be especially interesting is that in their incarnation as
1980s Reagan Republicans, Collier and Horowitz showed the same
character and sensibility as they showed in their incarnation as 1960s
student radicals. This is a character and a sensibility that is attracted
not only to sharp and simple distinctions between good people and evil
people, and not only to an unduly clear sense of precisely which peo-
ple stand with us and which stand against us, but also and precisely
for the same reason to a form of dehumanization. The seeds of vio-
lence can usually be found here.
Some people think that America has had one or perhaps two con-
stitutional "moments"; others think that the New Deal qualifies as a
third such moment, or even that America has had a large number of
constitutional moments. In my view, any such picture is somewhat
artificial-useful for heuristic purposes, but much too simple for real-
ity. Our constitutional development has been jagged and somewhat
unruly. It has many of the characteristics of a common-law process,
punctuated by periods of public upheaval, in which the common-law
process becomes less cautious and incremental than it usually is. The
civil rights movement of the 1960s was one such period of public
punctuation, and its principal actors were, in that sense, constitution-
makers. The meaning of the civil rights movement has yet to be set-
tled. But it is hardly adventurous to say that the period has had a
significant and continuing influence on our understanding of the
American political order, and that debates over its meaning and sig-
nificance will help determine the meaning of that political order in the
future. I have suggested that an insistence on the deviation between
ideal and reality, or freedom from desperate conditions, opposition to
caste, and caution about the judiciary were defining features of the
civil rights movement. It should not be too much to suggest that those
commitments ought to play a large role in similar movements in the
future.
No. 1]
